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Abstract
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986), assuming linear demand and cost
functions with fixed fee licensing it was argued that for the outside innovating firm under
oligopoly when the number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market
with license of its cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (entry with license
strategy) is more profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm
without entering themarket (license without entry strategy). However, their result depends
on their definition of license fee, and it is inappropriate if the innovating firm can enter the
market. If we adopt an alternative more appropriate definition based on the threat by entry
of the innovating firm, license without entry strategy is more profitable in the case of linear
demand and cost functions. Also we investigate the problem in the case of quadratic cost
functions in which entry with license strategy may be optimal. Further we will show that
the optimal strategies for the innovating firm when license fees are determined under the
assumption that the licensor takes all benefit of new technology and its optimal strategies
when license fees are determined according to Nash bargaining solution are the same.
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1 Introduction
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986), assuming linear demand and cost functions
with fixed fee licensing it was argued that for the outside innovating firm under oligopoly when
the number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market and at the same time
license its cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (entry with license strategy) is more
profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the
market (license without entry strategy). However, their result depends on their definition of
license fee. Interpreting their analysis in a duopoly model, they defined the license fee in the
case of license without entry by the diﬀerence between the profit of the incumbent firm in that
case and its monopoly profit before entry and license. It is inappropriate when the innovator
can enter the market on the ground of game theoretic view point. If the negotiation between the
innovating firm and the incumbent firm about the license fee breaks down, that is, the oﬀered
license fee is refused by the incumbent firm, the innovating firm can punish the incumbent firm
by entering the market without license. The innovating firm may use this threat if and only if
it is a credible threat. When the innovating firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is
zero; however, when it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, such
a threat is credible. Then, even if the innovating firm does not enter the market, the incumbent
firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit when it uses the new technology and its profit
when the innovating firm enters without license as a license fee.
In this paper we examine a choice of strategies for the outside innovating firm under duopoly
to license its new cost-reducing technology with a fixed fee to the incumbent firm without
entry, or to enter the market without license, or to enter the market with license. At present
the incumbent firm is a monopolist, and if the innovating firm enters, the market becomes a
duopoly. Using an alternative definition of a license fee based on above considerations we will
show the result which is converse to the result in Kamien and Tauman (1986) that license
without entry strategy is optimal for the innovator, and entry with license strategy is never
optimal in the case of linear demand and cost functions. Also we will consider a case of
quadratic cost functions in which entry with license strategy can be optimal.
In more detail we will show the following results. When the cost functions are linear, if
the innovation is non-drastic, license without entry strategy is the optimal strategy for the
innovating firm; if the innovation is drastic, both of entry without license and license without
entry strategies are the optimal strategies. When the cost functions are quadratic, so long as the
innovation is not so drastic, entry with license strategy is the optimal strategy for the innovating
firm; if the innovation is very drastic, license without entry strategy is the optimal strategy.
Further we consider two cases about determination of license fees. The first is a case such
that the licensor takes all of the profit increase due to adoption of the new technology. We call
this case the licensor takes all case. The second is a case such that license fees are determined
according to Nash bargaining solution. We call this case the Nash bargaining solution case.
We will show that the same results hold in both cases, that is, determination of the optimal
strategies for the innovating firm in the licensor takes all case and that in the Nash bargaining
solution case are the same.
In the next section we review some related studies including Kamien and Tauman (1986).
In Section 3 we present the model. In Section 4 we study the licensor takes all case, and in
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Section 5 we consider the Nash bargaining solution case.
2 Some related studies
We mention some references about technology adoption or R&D investment under imperfect
competition including Kamien and Tauman (1986). Lots of researches focus on the relation
between technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of means of contracts which are
royalties, up-front fixed fees, the combinations of these two and auction are well discussed
(Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Also, the previous works analyze the diﬀerence of whether the
licensor have the production capacity, which is externally given, or not. Kamien and Tauman
(1986) shows that if the licensor does not have production capacity, fixed fee is better than
royalty and it is also better for consumers. Kamien and Tauman (2002) shows that outside
innovator prefers auction but industry incumbent prefers royalty. This topic under Stackelberg
oligopoly is discussed in Kabiraj (2004) when the licensor does not have production capacity,
and discussed in Wang and Yang (2004) when the licensor has production capacity.
Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail when the licensor is an
outsider and that when the licensor is an incumbent firm using the combination of royalties and
fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity is given externally and it does not
analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovator who can use
the entry as threat are not discussed enough. About the strategies of new entrant to the market,
Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) pay attention to the future entrants with old technology, and
argues that low license fee can be used to deter entry of potential entrants. But, it is assumed
that the firm with new technology is incumbent and its choice of entry is not analyzed. Also,
Chen (2016) analyzed the model of endogenous market structure determined by the potential
entrant with the old technology and shows that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero royalty
in both incumbent and outside innovator cases which is exogenously given. In this paper we
consider process innovation, that is, cost-reducing innovation. On the other hand, Hattori and
Tanaka (2016b) analyzed license and entry strategies of an innovator about product innovation,
that is, introduction of higher quality good in vertically diﬀerentiated industry, and has shown
similar results.
Other topics are analyzed as follows. A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost
asymmetry is analyzed in La Manna (1993). He shows that if technologies can be replicated
perfectly, a lower-cost firm always has the incentive to transfer its technology and hence a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully asymmetric, but there exists no non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the other hand, using cooperative game theory,
Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyses bargaining between licensor with no production capacity
and oligopolistic firms. In recent research, market structure and technology improvement is
analyzed. Boone (2001) andMatsumura et. al. (2013) find a non-monotonic relation between
intensity of competition and innovation. Also, Pal (2010) shows that technology adoption
may change the market outcome. The social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than
in Cournot competition. However, if we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition
may make more social welfare than Bertrand competition under diﬀerentiated goods market.
In Hattori and Tanaka (2014) and Hattori and Tanaka (2016a) adoption of new technology
3
in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg duopoly is analyzed. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012)
presented analyses about the eﬀectiveness of R&D subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the
cases of international R&D competition and cooperation.
3 Themodel
There are two firms Firm A and B. Firm A is an innovating firm and Firm B is an incumbent
firm. Although at present only Firm B produces a good and Firm A is an outside innovator,
after introducing the new technology, Firm A may also produce the same good. It has a
superior new technology and can produce the good at lower cost than Firm B.
Firm A have three options. One option is to enter the market without license to Firm B, the
second option is to license its superior technology to Firm B, and the third option is to enter
the market with license to Firm B. If the innovating firm enters, the market becomes a duopoly.
Let p be the price and X be the total supply of the good. The inverse demand function of
the good is written as
p = a − X .
a is a positive constant. Let xA and xB be the outputs of Firm A and B.
About determination of license fees we consider two cases. The first is a case where the
licensor takes all of the profit increase due to adoption of new technology. We call this case
the licensor takes all case. The second is a case where license fees are determined according
to Nash bargaining solution. We call this case the Nash bargaining solution case. We will
show that the same results hold in both cases, that is, determination of the optimal strategy for
the innovating firm in the licensor takes all case and that in the Nash bargaining solution case
are the same.
About cost functions of the firms we consider two cases. One is a case of linear cost
functions, and the other is a case of quadratic cost functions. In the linear cost functions case,
the cost functions of Firm A and B are cAxA and cBxB, where cA and cB are positive constants
such that cA < cB. In the quadratic cost functions case the cost functions of Firm A and B are
cAx
2
A and cBx
2
B, where cA and cB are positive constants such that cA < cB.
We define drasticity of innovation for each case of cost functions.
Linear cost functions case 1. The innovation is non-drastic if cA > 2cB − a.
2. The innovation is drastic if cA ≤ 2cB − a. In this case the output of the incumbent
firm is zero when the innovating firm enters the market without license.
Quadratic cost functions case 1. The innovation is not so drastic if cA >
√
2−1
2 .
2. The innovation is very drastic if cA ≤
√
2−1
2 .
4 Licensor takes all case
Suppose that the licensor takes all of the increase in the profit of Firm B due to adoption of the
new technology.
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4.1 Linear cost functions
First we investigate a case of linear cost functions.
4.1.1 Case A: entry without license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to Firm B. The inverse demand function
in this case is written as
p = a − xA − xB .
The profits of Firm A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAxA,
piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cBxB .
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The conditions for profit maximization of
Firm A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − cA = 0,
a − xA − 2xB − cB = 0.
1. If the innovation is non-drastic (cA > 2cB − a), then xB > 0, and the equilibrium outputs,
price and profits are
xA =
a − 2cA + cB
3
, xB =
a − 2cB + cA
3
,
p =
a + cA + cB
3
,
piA =
(a − 2cA + cB)2
9
, piB =
(a − 2cB + cA)2
9
.
2. If the innovation is drastic (cA ≤ 2cB −a), then xB = 0, that is, Firm B drops out from the
market, and the equilibrium output of Firm A, the price and the profits of the firms are
xA =
a − cA
2
, p =
a + cA
2
,
piA =
(a − cA)2
4
, piB = 0.
Firm A becomes a monopolist.
Denote the profits of Firm A and B in this case by pi eA and pi
e
B.
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4.1.2 Case B: license without entry
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B at a fixed license fee, and does not
enter the market. Denote the fixed license fee by L.
The inverse demand function is
p = a − xB .
The profit of Firm B is
piB = (a − xB)xB − cAxB − L.
Firm B can produce the good at the marginal cost cA < cB. The equilibrium output, price and
profit are
xB =
a − cA
2
, p =
a + cA
2
, piB =
(a − cA)2
4
− L.
If the negotiation between the innovating firm and the incumbent firm about the license fee
breaks down, the innovating firm can enter the market without license. When the innovating
firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is zero; however, when it enters the market
without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, such a threat is credible, and the incumbent
firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in this case and its
profit in the previous entry without license case as a license fee.
1. If the innovation is non-drastic (cA > 2cB − a), the license fee is equal to
L =
(a − cA)2
4
− (a − 2cB + cA)
2
9
=
(a + 4cB − 5cA)(5a − 4cB − cA)
36
.
2. If the innovation is drastic (cA ≤ 2cB − a), the license fee is equal to
L =
(a − cA)2
4
− 0 = (a − cA)
2
4
.
Denote the profit of Firm B and the license fee in this case by pi lB and L
l .
4.1.3 Case C: entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to Firm B
at a fixed license fee. The inverse demand function is
p = a − xA − xB .
The profits of Firm A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAxA,
piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cAxB − L.
L is the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − cA = 0,
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a − xA − 2xB − cA = 0.
The equilibrium outputs, price and profits are
xA =
a − cA
3
, xB =
a − cA
3
, p =
a + 2cA
3
,
piA =
(a − cA)2
9
, piB =
(a − cA)2
9
− L.
Similarly to the previous case if the negotiation between the innovating firm and the incumbent
firm about the license fee breaks down, the innovating firm can enter themarket without license.
The incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in this
case and its profit in the entry without license case as a license fee.
1. If cA > 2cB − a, the license fee is equal to
L =
(a − cA)2
9
− (a − 2cB + cA)
2
9
=
4(a − cB)(cB − cA)
9
.
The total profit of Firm A is the sum of the license fee and its profit as a firm in the
duopoly. It is equal to
(a − cA)2
9
+
4(a − cB)(cB − cA)
9
=
a2 − 6acA + c2A + 4acB + 4cAcB − 4c2B
9
.
2. If cA ≤ 2cB − a, the license fee is equal to
L =
(a − cA)2
9
− 0 = (a − cA)
2
9
.
The total profit of Firm A is
(a − cA)2
9
+
(a − cA)2
9
=
2(a − cA)2
9
.
Denote the profits of Firm A and B, and the license fee in this case by pi elA , pi
el
B and L
el .
4.1.4 The optimal strategy for the innovator
1. First assume cA > 2cB − a. Let us compare the profit of Firm A in Case B (license
without entry) and its profit in Case C (entry with license). Then, we get
Ll − (Lel + pi elA ) =
(a + 4cB − 5cA)(5a − 4cB − cA)
36
− a
2 − 6acA + c2A + 4acB + 4cAcB − 4c2B
9
=
(a − cA)2
36
> 0.
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Thus, license without entry strategy is more profitable than entry with license strategy
for the innovating firm. Next let us compare the profit of Firm A in Case B and its profit
in Case A (entry without license). Then,
Ll − pi eA =
(a + 4cB − 5cA)(5a − 4cB − cA)
36
− (a − 2cA + cB)
2
9
=
(a − 2cB + cA)(a − 11cA + 10cB)
36
.
Since a > 2cB − cA and
a − 11cA + 10cB = a − 2cB + cA + 12(cB − cA) > 0,
we have Ll − pi eA > 0. Thus, license without entry strategy is more profitable than entry
without license strategy for the innovating firm. Therefore, license without entry strategy
is the optimal strategy for the innovating firm.
2. Assume cA ≤ 2cB − a. Then, we obtain
Ll − (Lel + pi elA ) =
(a − cA)2
4
− 2(a − cA)
2
9
=
(a − cA)2
36
> 0,
and
Ll − pi eA =
(a − cA)2
4
− (a − cA)
2
4
= 0.
Thus, both of license without entry strategy and entry without license strategy are the optimal
strategies for the innovating firm. Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition
Proposition 1. In the linear cost functions case, if the innovation is non-drastic (cA > 2cB −a),
license without entry strategy is the optimal strategy for the innovating firm. On the other
hand, if the innovation is drastic (cA ≤ 2cB − a), both of license without entry strategy and
entry without license strategy are its optimal strategies.
This result is converse to the result in Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986). In the
definition by Kamien and Tauman (1986) the license fee in the case of license without entry
is equal to the profit of the incumbent firm in that case and its profit before license and entry.
However, by our definition the license fee in that case is equal to the profit of the incumbent
firm in that case and its profit when the innovating firm enters the market without license.
Therefore, the license fee in that case under the alternative definition is larger than that under
the definition by Kamien and Tauman (1986), and so license without entry strategy can be
optimal.
Example
Assume a = 18, cB = 10. The relationships among the profits of Firm A in three cases and the
value of cA are depicted in Fig. 1.
In the domain 0 ≤ cA ≤ 2, pi eA and Ll coincide.
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Figure 1: Example of the linear cost functions case
4.2 Quadratic cost functions
In this section we investigate the case of quadratic cost functions.
4.2.1 Case A: entry without license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market. The inverse demand function is written as
p = a − xA − xB .
The profits of Firm A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAx2A,
piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cBx2B .
The conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − 2cAxA = 0,
a − xA − 2xB − 2cBxB = 0.
The equilibrium values of the outputs, price and profits are
xA =
(1 + 2cB)a
3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB
, xB =
(1 + 2cA)a
3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB
,
p =
(1 + 2cA)(1 + 2cB)a
3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB
,
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piA =
(1 + cA)(1 + 2cB)2a2
(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 , piB =
(1 + cB)(1 + 2cA)2a2
(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 .
Denote the profits of Firm A and B in this case by pi eA and pi
e
B.
4.2.2 Case B: license without entry
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B at a fixed license fee, and does not
enter the market. Denote the fixed license fee by L.
The inverse demand function is
p = a − xB .
The profit of Firm B is
piB = (a − xB)xB − cAx2B − L.
The equilibrium output, price and profit are
xB =
a
2(1 + cA) , p =
(1 + 2cA)a
2(1 + cA) , piB =
a2
4(1 + cA) − L.
If the negotiation between the innovating firm and the incumbent firm about the license
fee breaks down, the innovating firm can enter the market without license. Therefore, the
incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in this case
and its profit in the previous entry without license case as a license fee. Thus, the license fee is
L =
a2
4(1 + cA) −
(1 + cB)(1 + 2cA)2a2
(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
=
(16c2Ac2B + 32cAc2B + 16c2B − 16c3AcB + 36cAcB + 20cB − 16c3A − 16c2A + 4cA + 5)a2
4(1 + cA)(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 .
Denote the profit of Firm B and the license fee in this case by pi lB and L
l .
4.2.3 Case C: entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to Firm B
at a fixed license fee. The inverse demand function is
p = a − xA − xB .
The profits of Firm A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAx2A,
piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cAx2B − L.
The conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − 2cAxA = 0,
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a − xA − 2xB − 2cAxB = 0.
The equilibrium outputs, price and profits are
xA =
a
3 + 2cA
, xB =
a
3 + 2cA
, p =
(1 + 2cA)a
3 + 2cA
,
piA =
(1 + cA)2a2
(3 + 2cA)2 , piB =
(1 + cA)2a2
(3 + 2cA)2 − L.
Similarly to the previous case if the negotiation between the innovating firm and the incumbent
firm about the license fee breaks down, the innovating firm can enter themarket without license.
The incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in this
case and its profit in the entry without license case as a license fee. Thus, the license fee is
L =
(1 + cA)2a2
(3 + 2cA)2 −
(1 + cB)(1 + 2cA)2a2
(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
=
(cB − cA)(16c3AcB + 48c2AcB + 48cAcB + 16cB + 16c3A + 48c2A + 48cA + 15)a2
(3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 .
The total profit of Firm A in this case is the sum of the license fee and its profit as a firm in the
duopoly. It is
(1 + cA)2a2
(3 + 2cA)2 + L =
A
(3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 ,
where
A =(32c3Ac2B + 96c2Ac2B + 96cAc2B + 32c2B − 16c4AcB + 88c2AcB + 112cAcB + 39cB
− 16c4A − 32c3A − 8c2A + 18cA + 9)a2.
Denote the profits of Firm A and B, and the license fee in this case by pi elA , pi
el
B and L
el .
4.2.4 The optimal strategy for the innovator
Let us compare the profit of Firm A in Case C (entry with license) and its profit in Case B
(license without entry). Then, we get
(pi elA + Lel ) − Ll =
A
(3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
− (16c
2
Ac
2
B + 32cAc
2
B + 16c
2
B − 16c3AcB + 36cAcB + 20cB − 16c3A − 16c2A + 4cA + 5)a2
4(1 + cA)(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
=
(4c2A + 4cA − 1)a2
4(1 + cA)(3 + 2cA)2 ,
where A is the same as that in Case C. This is positive when cA >
√
2−1
2 ≈ 0.207 irrespective
of the values of a and cB. Thus, so long as the innovation is not so drastic, in the quadratic
11
cost functions case entry with license strategy is more profitable than license without entry
strategy. However, if cA <
√
2−1
2 , license without entry strategy is more profitable than entry
with license strategy. If cA =
√
2−1
2 , they are indiﬀerent.
Let us compare the profit of FirmA in Case B and its profit in Case A (entry without license).
Then, we have
Ll − pi eA
=
(16c2Ac2B + 32cAc2B + 16c2B − 16c3AcB + 36cAcB + 20cB − 16c3A − 16c2A + 4cA + 5)a2
4(1 + cA)(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
− (1 + cA)(1 + 2cB)
2a2
(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
= −(1 + 2cA)(8c
2
AcB + 4cAcB − 4cB + 8c2A + 6cA − 1)a2
4(1 + cA)(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 .
This is positive for 0 < cA ≤
√
36c2B+52cB+17−2cB−3
8(1+cB ) .
√
36c2B+52cB+17−2cB−3
8(1+cB ) is larger than
√
2−1
2 for
cB >
√
2−1
2 .
Let us compare the profit of Firm A in Case C and its profit in Case A. Then,
(pi elA + Lel ) − pi eA =
A
(3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 −
(1 + cA)(1 + 2cB)2)a2
3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2
=
(cB − cA)(16c3AcB + 32c2AcB + 12cAcB − 4cB + 16c3A + 36c2A + 24cA + 3)a2
(3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 .
This is positive except for very small value of cA, and we can verify that it is positive for√
2−1
2 ≤ cA < cB. We have cB − cA > 0 and (3 + 2cA)2(3 + 4cA + 4cB + 4cAcB)2 > 0. Let
φ = 16c3AcB + 32c
2
AcB + 12cAcB − 4cB + 16c3A + 36c2A + 24cA + 3.
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to cA yields
dφ
dcA
= 4(12c2AcB + 16cAcB + 3cB + 12c2A + 18cA + 6) > 0.
We have
φ
cA=
√
2−1
2
= 4(
√
2 + 1) > 0.
Thus, φ is positive for
√
2−1
2 ≤ cA < cB.
Therefore, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2. In the case of quadratic cost functions so long as the innovation is not so
drastic (cA >
√
2−1
2 ), entry with license strategy is the optimal strategy for the innovating firm.
However, if the innovation is very drastic (cA <
√
2−1
2 ), license without entry strategy is the
optimal strategy. If cA =
√
2−1
2 , both of them are the optimal strategies.
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Figure 2: Example of the quadratic cost functions case 1
When the cost functions of the firms are quadratic, their marginal costs are increasing with
respect to the outputs, and then large outputs are unprofitable than small outputs. Therefore,
entry with license strategy is optimal for the innovating firm so long as the innovation is not so
drastic. However, the innovation is very drastic, the marginal cost of a firm which adopts the
new technology is small even if the cost functions are quadratic. Thus, in that case the optimal
strategy for the innovating firm is license without entry strategy.
A note on the case where cB ≤
√
2−1
2
When cB ≤
√
2−1
2 , we can verify cA < cB ≤
√
36c2B+52cB+17−2cB−3
8(1+cB ) . Then, since L
l > pi eA and
Ll > pi eA + L
el , license without entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
Example
Assume a = 30, cB = 10. The relationship among the profits of Firm A in three cases and the
value of cA are depicted in Fig. 2 and 3. Fig. 3 magnifies the part where the value of cA is
small.
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Figure 3: Example of the quadratic cost functions case 2
5 The Nash bargaining solution case
We consider the results when license fees are determined according to the Nash bargaining
solution. The arguments hold for both linear and quadratic cost functions cases1. We use the
following notations.
pi eA, pi
e
B: profits of Firm A and B in Case A
ϕlB: profit of Firm B in Case B before paying the license fee
L˜l , L˜el : license fees in Case B and Case C
pi lB(= ϕlB − L˜l ): profit of Firm B in Case B after paying the license fee
ϕelB : profit of Firm B in Case C before paying the license fee
pi elB (= ϕelB − L˜el ): profit of Firm B in Case C after paying the license fee
pi elA : profit of Firm A in Case C
The values of them other than the license fees in this case are equal to those in the licensor
takes all case. The payoﬀ of Firm A in the license without entry case is L˜l , and it is pi elA + L˜
el
in the entry with license case.
The threat point of the negotiation is (pi eA,pi eB). In the license without entry case the problem
of maximization of the Nash product is written as follows.
max
L˜l
(L˜l − pi eA)(pi lB − pi eB) subject to L˜l + pi lB = ϕlB .
The condition for the solution is
L˜l − pi eA = pi lB − pi eB .
1Watanabe and Muto (2008) also analyzed bargaining among licensor and licensees. However, they used the
concepts of core and bargaining set, and did not used Nash bargaining solution.
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We get
L˜l =
ϕlB + pi
e
A − pi eB
2
.
In the entry with license case the problem of maximization of the Nash product is written
as follows.
max
L˜el
(pi elA + L˜el − pi eA)(pi elB − pi eB) subject to L˜el + pi elB = ϕelB .
The condition for the solution is
pi elA + L˜
el − pi eA = pi elB − pi eB .
We get
L˜el =
ϕelB − pi eB + pi eA − pi elA
2
.
and
pi elA + L˜
el =
ϕelB − pi eB + pi eA + pi elA
2
.
1. Comparison between the payoﬀ of Firm A in Case B and its payoﬀ in Case A yields
L˜l − pi eA =
ϕlB − pi eA − pi eB
2
. (1)
2. Comparison between the payoﬀ of Firm A in Case C and its payoﬀ in Case A yields
pi elA + L˜
el − pi eA =
ϕelB − pi eB + pi elA − pi eA
2
. (2)
3. Comparison between the payoﬀ of Firm A in Case C and its payoﬀ in Case B yields
pi elA + L˜
el − L˜l = ϕ
el
B − pi eB + pi eA + pi elA
2
− ϕ
l
B + pi
e
A − pi eB
2
=
ϕelB + pi
el
A − ϕlB
2
. (3)
On the other hand, since Ll = ϕlB − pi eB in the licensor takes all case, we obtain
Ll − pi eA = ϕlB − pi eA − pi eB .
It is exactly twice of (1). Since Lel = ϕelB − pi eB,
pi elA + L
el − pi eA = ϕelB − pi eB + pi elA − pi eA.
It is exactly twice of (2). And we obtain
pi elA + L
el − Ll = pi elA + ϕelB − pi eB − ϕlB + pi eB = pi elA + ϕelB − ϕlB .
It is exactly twice of (3). Therefore, we get the following result.
15
Proposition 3. The determination of the optimal strategy for the innovating firm in the Nash
bargaining solution case is the same as that in the licensor takes all case, and Proposition 1
and 2 are robust for determination of license fees according to the Nash bargaining solution.
Now we compare the license fees in the Nash bargaining solution case and those in the
licensor takes all case. Since Ll − pi eA = 2(L˜l − pi eA), we have
Ll − L˜l = L˜l − pi eA.
Therefore, if Ll > pi eA and L˜
l > pi eA, L
l is larger than L˜l , and if Ll < pi eA and L˜
l < pi eA, L
l is smaller
than L˜l .
Also, since pi elA + L
el − pi eA = 2(pi elA + L˜el − pi eA), we have
Lel − L˜el = pi elA + L˜el − pi eA.
Therefore, if pi elA + L
el > pi eA and pi
el
A + L˜
el > pi eA, L
el is larger than L˜el , and if pi elA + L
el < pi eA and
pi elA + L˜
el < pi eA, L
el is smaller than L˜el .
We have shown the following results.
Proposition 4. 1. If license without entry strategy is more (or less) profitable for the
innovating firm than entry without license strategy, the license fee in Case B in the
licensor takes all case is larger (or smaller) than the license fee in the Nash bargaining
solution case.
2. If entry with license strategy is more (or less) profitable for the innovating firm than
entry without license strategy, the license fee in Case C in the licensor takes all case is
larger (or smaller) than the license fee in the Nash bargaining solution case.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an alternative definition of license fee for new technology developed by
an outside innovator under duopoly when the outside innovator can enter the market with or
without license, replacing the definition by Kamien and Tauman (1986). Our definition of
license fee is based on the threat to the incumbent firm by entry of the innovating firm when
the incumbent firm does not buy a license in the case of license without entry. We have shown
that in the linear demand and cost functions case although the innovator’s optimal strategy
according to the definition by Kamien and Tauman (1986) is entry with license strategy, it is
license without entry strategy according to the alternative definition. Also we have presented
results when the cost functions of the firms are quadratic. In that case entry with license
strategy may be optimal. Further we have shown that the optimal strategy for the innovator
when the license fees are determined under the assumption that the licensor takes all benefit
of new technology and its optimal strategy when the license fees are determined according to
the Nash bargaining solution are the same.
In the future research we want to study the problem under oligopoly, that is, the case with
more than one incumbent firms, and government’s policy to promote or prevent license or
entry by the innovating firm. Under oligopoly, credibility of threats is more subtle problem
than under duopoly.
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